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The Volkswagen emissions scandal came to light in September 2015. The company installed software 
into millions of vehicles with diesel engines so that impressive emission readings would be recorded 
in laboratory conditions even though the reality is that the diesel engines do not comply with 
current emission regulations. Volkswagen is a worldwide organisation with its headquarters in 
Germany. Its subsidiaries adhere to common policies and a corporate culture. This worldwide 
scandal broke first in the US with ongoing investigation and legal action there and in other countries 
including Germany, Italy and the UK.  
 
Combustion engines are the source of pollution and therefore have been subjected to emission 
control. The formation of NOx (nitrogen oxides) through combustion is a significant contributor to 
ground-level ozone and fine particle pollution which is a health risk. On this basis, the use of 
software to control emissions must be defined as safety critical for, if it fails or malfunctions, it can 
cause death or serious injury to people. There does not appear to be any acknowledgement of this 
across vehicle manufacturing. 
 
The statement from the US Department of Justice1 details the facts of the VW emissions case. Two 
senior managers, Jens Hadler and Richard Dorenkamp appear to be at the centre of the so-called 
defeat software’s ongoing design and implementation processes. These began in 2006, with the 
design of a new diesel engine to meet stricter US emission standards to take effect in 2007. The goal 
was to market new vehicles as meeting the stricter standards and attract US buyers. Being unable to 
accomplish this, the engineers working under Hadler and Dorenkamp, developed software which 
allowed vehicles to distinguish test mode from drive mode thus satisfying the emissions test whilst 
allowing much greater emissions when vehicles were on the road. “Hadler authorized Dorenkamp to 
proceed with the project knowing that only the use of the defeat device software would enable VW 
diesel vehicles to pass U.S. emissions tests.” 
 
Drawing upon the Statement of Facts, Leggett2 reported that whilst there had been some concerns 
over the propriety of the defeat software all those involved in the discussions including engineers 
were instructed not to get caught and furthermore to destroy related documents. According to 
Mansouri3, Volkswagen is an autocratic company with a reputation for avoiding dissent and 
discussion. It has a compliant business culture where employees are aware that underperformance 
can result in replacement and so management demands must be met to ensure job security Three 
statements in particular in the Volkswagen Group Code of Conduct4; Promotion of Interests(ibid., p15), 
Secrecy(ibid., p16) and Responsibility for Compliance(ibid., p22), align with the ongoing conduct encouraged 
during the emissions debacle. Trope and Ressler5 explain that as an autocratic book of rules, the 
group code supports and even promotes dishonest dysfunctional behaviour which includes the 
creation of software to cheat, rather than solve, engineering problems and to protect that software 
from disclosure as if it were a trade secret. 
 
On 11 January 2017, the US Justice Department announced that, “Volkswagen had agreed to plead 
guilty to three criminal felony counts, and pay a $2.8 billion criminal penalty, as a result of the 
company’s long-running scheme to sell approximately 590,000 diesel vehicles in the U.S. by using a 
defeat device to cheat on emissions tests mandated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
and the California Air Resources Board (CARB), and lying and obstructing justice to further the 
scheme.” 
 
 
Business analysis 
 
Many of the accounts about the Volkswagen emissions case focus on business ethics with only a few 
touching upon the role of the software engineers in this situation. These accounts at times are 
repetitive but intertwine to provide a rich view. The widespread unethical actions across Volkswagen 
can be described as a new type of irresponsible behaviour, namely deceptive manipulation6. The 
detail of this and the associated corporate repercussions are discussed further by Stanwick and 
Stanwick7. 
 
Software engineers at Volkswagen faced ethical and legal issues that are easy to identify. Plant8 
suggests that they should have alerted external bodies since the internal lines of reporting were 
compromised. Merkel9 concurs citing the Software Engineering Code of Ethics and Professional 
Practice (see http://www.acm.org/about/se-code) by way of justification, and adds that the lack of 
whistleblowers in such a large group is surprising. Both authors point to the potential personal cost 
of whistleblowing as the reason it did not happen. Rhodes10 adds a second factor, arguing that 
corporate business ethics is very much a pro-business stance which is implemented through 
corporate control and compliance systems, and instruments of managerial coordination. This can 
enable the pursuit of business self-interest through organised widespread conspiracies involving 
lying, cheating, fraud and lawlessness. This is what happened at Volkswagen. Queen11 concurs, 
explaining that Volkswagen intentionally deceived those to whom it owed a duty of honesty. The 
pressure for continuous growth and the perception that failure was not an option12 created a culture 
where corporate secrecy was paramount which in turn implicitly outlawed whistleblowing. 
 
 
The role of software engineering 
 
If one has a responsibility for the planning, design, programming or implementation of software then 
that aspect of one’s work falls within the scope of the Software Engineering Code of Ethics and 
Professional Practice regardless of one’s job title. In that sense software engineering pervades this 
debacle and is therefore worthy of further investigation. 
 
So what was the role of software engineers in the creation and installation of VW’s defeat software? 
This question can be addressed using the Software Engineering Code of Ethics and Professional 
Practice. The code is long established, documenting the ethical and professional obligations of 
software engineers and identifying the standards society expects of them13. The code translates 
ethical principles into practical guidance. It encourages positive action and resistance to act 
unethically. It has been adopted by many professional bodies and companies worldwide and has 
been translated into Arabic, Croatian, French, German, Hebrew, Italian, Mandarin, Japanese and 
Spanish.  
 
Software engineers and software engineering educators have a responsibility to be cognisant of the 
code and its requirements. Public Interest is central to the code which is apposite for safety critical 
software. Although education can influence the courage and capability to act in accordance with the 
code, that result depends on structural and psychological supports within the environment in which 
engineers practice.  
 
The actions of VW managers and software engineers violated the following principles of the code:  
 
Principle 1.03 “approve software only if they have a well-founded belief that it is safe, meets 
specifications, passes appropriate tests, and does not diminish quality of life, diminish privacy, or 
harm the environment. The ultimate effect of the work should be to the public good.” The defeat 
software is clearly unsafe given NOx pollution damages both health and the environment. The public 
were under the misapprehension that VW cars were emitting low levels of NOx and therefore not a 
health risk. Thus software engineers installed unethical software. 
 
Principle 1.04 “disclose to appropriate persons or authorities any actual or potential danger to the 
user, the public, or the environment, that they reasonably believe to be associated with software or 
related documents.” There is no evidence that any software engineer disclosed. Commercial 
software is usually developed in teams and in this case it is likely this was a large team spanning all 
aspect of software development. 
 
Principle 1.06 “be fair and avoid deception in all statements, particularly public ones, concerning 
software or related documents, methods and tools.” The emissions software was heralded publically 
as a success when internally there was widespread knowledge that this claim was fraudulent. 
Software engineers were likely to have been privy to this cover-up. 
 
Principle 2.07 “identify, document, and report significant issues of social concern, of which they are 
aware, in software or related documents, to the employer or the client.” There is some evidence 
that concern was raised about the efficacy of the defeat software but it seems those in dissent 
allowed themselves to be managed towards deception. 
 
Principle 3.03 “identify, define and address ethical, economic, cultural, legal and environmental 
issues related to work projects.” The EPA regulations are explicit and are legally binding. From the 
evidence accessed it is unclear as to whether software engineers knew of the illegality of their 
actions. Nevertheless ignorance cannot and must not be a form of defence. 
 
Principle 6.06 “obey all laws governing [the] work, unless, in exceptional circumstances, such 
compliance is inconsistent with the public interest.” This relates to the analysis under principle 3.03. 
Compliance to further the prosperity of Volkswagen was at the expense of legal compliance. 
 
Principle 6.07 “be accurate in stating the characteristics of software on which they work, avoiding 
not only false claims but also claims that might reasonably be supposed to be speculative, vacuous, 
deceptive, misleading, or doubtful.” Software engineers could argue internally that the software 
indeed performed as it was designed to. However, the design was to achieve regulatory and public 
deception. 
 
Principle 6.13 “report significant violations of this Code to appropriate authorities when it is clear 
that consultation with people involved in these significant violations is impossible, counter-
productive or dangerous.” Given the apparent corporate culture within Volkswagen there was little 
point in reporting concerns further up the line. In fact the corporate code seems at odds with the 
professional code regarding this point. Software engineers failed to report these breaches to 
appropriate authorities. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Professionals, who must have been party to this illegal and unethical act, developed and 
implemented this software. Those who undertake the planning, development and operation of 
software have obligations to ensure integrity of output and overall to contribute to the public 
good14. The ethical practice of software engineers is paramount. Practice comprises process and 
product. Process concerns virtuous conduct of software engineers, whereas product concerns 
whether software is deemed to be ethically viable. Actions and outcomes in the Volkswagen case 
appear to have failed on both counts. 
 
These serious issues related to professional practice need to be addressed. It is hoped such issues 
are exceptional but sadly it is likely they are commonplace given the ongoing plethora of software 
disasters (see, for example, Catalogue of Catastrophe15 and Software Fail Watch16). Unethical actions 
related to software engineering can be addressed from two sides. One side focuses on resisting the 
temptation to perform unethical practice whilst the other focuses on reducing the opportunity of 
performing unethical practice. Society at large needs competent, ethical and altruistic professionals 
to deliver societally-acceptable, fit-for-purpose software. Both of these can be helped by education, 
but education will not suffice without adequate social supports. 
 
In order to fulfil software engineering duties, an individual must fully understand the professional 
responsibilities and obligations of the role. These are explicitly laid out in the Software Engineering 
Code of Ethics and Professional Practice and as such individuals must know and apply it to their 
everyday work. To achieve this, the effective education of new professionals is essential. Teaching 
technology in isolation is unacceptable and dangerous. Software engineers need a broader 
education to gain the necessary skills and knowledge to act in a socially responsible manner not on 
the basis of instinct and anecdote but on rigour and justification17. They must possess practical skills 
to address the complex ethical and societal issues which surround evolving and emerging 
technology. Such education should be based on a varied diet of participative experiential learning 
delivered by those who have a practical understanding of the design, development and delivery of 
software. Contrasting the Volkswagen Group Code of Conduct with the Software Engineering Code 
might provide one means for experiential learning. Such educated software engineers might find 
ways to prevent the installation of unethical software of the future. 
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